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Abstract
We propose a modal linear logic to reformulate intuitionistic modal logic S4 (IS4) in terms of
linear logic, establishing an S4-version of Girard translation from IS4 to it. While the Girard
translation from intuitionistic logic to linear logic is well-known, its extension to modal logic is
non-trivial since a naive combination of the S4 modality and the exponential modality causes an
undesirable interaction between the two modalities. To solve the problem, we introduce an extension
of intuitionistic multiplicative exponential linear logic with a modality combining the S4 modality
and the exponential modality, and show that it admits a sound translation from IS4. Through the
Curry–Howard correspondence we further obtain a Geometry of Interaction Machine semantics of
the modal λ-calculus by Pfenning and Davies for staged computation.
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1 Introduction
Linear logic discovered by Girard [7] is, as he wrote, not an alternative logic but should be
regarded as an “extension” of usual logics. Whereas usual logics such as classical logic and
intuitionistic logic admit the structural rules of weakening and contraction, linear logic does
not allow to use the rules freely, but it reintroduces them in a controlled manner by using
the exponential modality ‘!’ (and its dual ‘?’). Usual logics are then reconstructed in terms
of linear logic with the power of the exponential modalities, via the Girard translation.
In this paper, we aim to extend the framework of linear-logical reconstruction to the
(,⊃)-fragment of intuitionistic modal logic S4 (IS4) by establishing what we call “modal
linear logic” and an S4-version of Girard translation from IS4 into it. However, the crux to
give a faithful translation is that a naive combination of the -modality and the !-modality
causes an undesirable interaction between the inference rules of the two modalities. To solve
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Syntactic category
Formulae A,B,C ::= p | A( B | !A
Inference rule
AxA ` A
Γ ` A Γ′,A ` B
Cut
Γ,Γ′ ` B
!Γ ` A !R!Γ ` !A
Γ,A ` B
(RΓ ` A( B
Γ ` A Γ′,B ` C
(L
Γ,Γ′,A( B ` C
Γ,A ` B
!LΓ, !A ` B
Γ ` B !WΓ, !A ` B
Γ, !A, !A ` B
!CΓ, !A ` B
Figure 1 Definition of IMELL.
dAe
dpe def= p, dA ⊃ Be def= (!dAe)( dBe
dΓe
dΓe def= {dAe | A ∈ Γ}
Figure 2 Definition of the Girard translation from intuitionistic logic.
the problem, we define the modal linear logic as an extension of intuitionistic multiplicative
exponential linear logic with a modality ‘! ’ (pronounced by “bangbox”) that integrates ‘’
and ‘!’, and show that it admits a faithful translation from IS4.
As an application, we consider a computational interpretation of the modal linear logic. A
typed λ-calculus that we will define corresponds to a natural deduction for the modal linear
logic through the Curry–Howard correspondence, and it can be seen as a reconstruction of
the modal λ-calculus by Pfenning and Davies [18, 5] for the so-called staged computation.
Thanks to our linear-logical reconstruction, we can further obtain a Geometry of Interaction
Machine (GoIM) for the modal λ-calculus.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some
formalizations of linear logic and IS4. In Section 3 we explain a linear-logical reconstruction
of IS4. First, we discuss how a naive combination of linear logic and modal logic fails to
obtain a faithful translation. Then, we propose a modal linear logic with the ! -modality that
admits a faithful translation from IS4. In Section 4 we give a computational interpretation
of modal linear logic through a typed λ-calculus. In Section 5 we provide an axiomatization
of modal linear logic by a Hilbert-style deductive system. In Section 6 we obtain a GoIM of
our typed λ-calculus as an application of our linear-logical reconstruction. In Sections 7 and
8 we discuss related work and conclude our work, respectively.
2 Preliminaries
We recall several systems of linear logic and modal logic. In this paper, we consider the minimal
setting to give an S4-version of Girard translation and its computational interpretation.
Thus, every system we will use only contain an implication and a modality as operators.
2.1 Intuitionistic MELL and its Girard translation
Figure 1 shows the standard definition of the (!,()-fragment of intuitionistic multiplicative
exponential linear logic, which we refer to as IMELL. A formula is either a propositional
variable, a linear implication, or an exponential modality. We let p range over the set of
propositional variables, and A, B, C range over formulae. A context Γ is defined to be a
multiset of formulae, and hence the exchange rule is assumed as a meta-level operation. A
judgment consists of a context and a formula, written as Γ ` A. As a convention, we often
write Γ ` A to mean that the judgment is derivable (and we assume similar conventions
throughout this paper). The notation !Γ in the rule !R denotes the multiset {!A | A ∈ Γ}.
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Syntactic category
Formulae A,B,C ::= p | A ⊃ B | A
Inference rule
AxA ` A
Γ ` A Γ′,A ` B
Cut
Γ,Γ′ ` B
Γ ` A
R
Γ ` A
Γ,A ` B
⊃RΓ ` A ⊃ B
Γ ` A Γ′,B ` C
⊃L
Γ,Γ′,A ⊃ B ` C
Γ,A ` B
LΓ,A ` B
Γ ` B WΓ,A ` B
Γ,A,A ` B
CΓ,A ` B
Figure 3 Definition of LJ.
Figure 2 defines the Girard translation1 from the ⊃-fragment of intuitionistic propositional
logic IL. For an IL-formula A, dAe will be an IMELL-formula; and dΓe a multiset of IMELL-
formulae. Then, we can show that the Girard translation from IL to IMELL is sound.
I Theorem 1 (Soudness of the translation). If Γ ` A in IL, then !dΓe ` dAe in IMELL.
2.2 Intuitionistic S4
We review a formalization of the (,⊃)-fragment of intuitionistic propositional modal logic
S4 (IS4). In what follows, we use a sequent calculus for the logic, called LJ. The calculus
LJ used here is defined in a standard manner in the literature (e.g. it can be seen as the
IS4-fragment of G1s for classical modal logic S4 by Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [23]).
Figure 3 shows the definition of LJ. A formula is either a propositional variable, an
intuitionistic implication, or a box modality. A context and a judgment are defined similarly
in IMELL. The notation Γ in the rule R denotes the multiset {A | A ∈ Γ}.
I Remark 2. It is worth noting that the !-exponential in IMELL and the -modality in LJ
have similar structures. To see this, let us imagine the rules R and L replacing the symbol
‘’ with ‘!’. The results will be exactly the same as !R and !L. In fact, the !-exponential
satisfies the S4 axiomata in IMELL, which is the reason we also call it as a modality.
2.3 Typed λ-calculus of the intuitionistic S4
We review the modal λ-calculus developed by Pfenning and Davies [18, 5], which we call
λ. The system λ is essentially the same calculus as λ→e in [5], although some syntax are
changed to fit our notation in this paper. λ is known to correspond to a natural deduction
system for IS4, as is shown in [18].
Figure 4 shows the definition of λ. The set of types corresponds to that of formulae of IS4.
We let x range over the set of term variables, and M,N,L range over the set of terms. The
first three terms are as in the simply-typed λ-calculus. The terms M and letx = M in N
is used to represent a constructor and a destructor for types A, respectively. The variable
x in λx : A.M and letx = M in N is supposed to be bound in the usual sense and the scope
of the biding is M and N , respectively. The set of free (i.e., unbound) variables in M is
denoted by FV(M). We write the capture-avoiding substitution M [x := N ] to denote the
result of replacing N for every free occurrence of x in M .
A (type) context is defined to be the set of pairs of a term variable xi and a type Ai such
that all the variables are distinct, which is written as x1 : A1, · · · , xn : An and is denoted
by Γ, ∆, Σ, etc. Then, a (type) judgment is defined, in the so-called dual-context style, to
consists of two contexts, a term, and a type, written as ∆; Γ ` M : A.
1 This is known to be the call-by-name Girard translation (cf. [12]) and we only follow this version in
later discussions. However, we conjecture that our work can apply to other versions.
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Syntactic category
Types A,B,C ::= p | A ⊃ B | A
Terms M,N,L ::= x | λx : A.M | M N
| M | letx = M in N
Reduction rule
(β ⊃) (λx : A.M ) N  M [x := N ]
(β) letx = N in M  M [x := N ]
Typing rule
Ax∆; Γ, x : A ` x : A Ax∆, x : A; Γ ` x : A
∆; Γ, x : A ` M : B
⊃ I∆; Γ ` (λx : A.M ) : A ⊃ B
∆; Γ ` M : A ⊃ B ∆; Γ ` N : A
⊃E∆; Γ ` M N : B
∆; ∅ ` M : A
I∆; Γ ` M : A
∆; Γ ` M : A ∆, x : A; Γ ` N : B
E∆; Γ ` letx = M in N : B
Figure 4 Definition of λ.
The intuition behind the judgment ∆; Γ ` M : A is that the context ∆ is intended
to implicitly represent assumptions for types of form A, while the context Γ is used to
represent ordinary assumptions as in the simply-typed λ-calculus.
The typing rules are summarized as follows. Ax, ⊃ I, and ⊃E are all standard, although
they are defined in the dual-context style. Ax is another variable rule, which can be seen as
what to formalize the modal axiom T (i.e., ` A ⊃ A) from the logical viewpoint. I is a
rule for the constructor of A, which corresponds to the necessitation rule for the -modality.
Similarly, E is for the destructor of A, which corresponds to the elimination rule.
The reduction  is defined to be the least compatible relation on terms generated by
(β ⊃) and (β). The multistep reduction  + is defined to be the transitive closure of  .
3 Linear-logical reconstruction
3.1 Naive attempt at the linear-logical reconstruction
It is natural for a “linear-logical reconstruction” of IS4 to define a system that has both
properties of linear logic and modal logic, so as to be a target system for an S4-version of
Girard translation. However, a naive combination of linear logic and modal logic is not
suitable to establish a faithful translation.
Let us consider what happens if we adopt a naive system. The simplest way to define
a target system for the S4-version of Girard translation is to make an extension of IMELL
with the -modality. Suppose that a deductive system IMELL is such a calculus, that is,
the formulae of IMELL are defined by the following grammar:
A,B ::= p | A( B | !A | A
with the inference rules being those of IMELL, along with the rules R and L of LJ.
As in the case of Girard translation from IL to IMELL, we have to establish the following
theorem for some translation d−e:
If Γ ` A is derivable in LJ, then so is !dΓe ` dAe in IMELL.
but, if we extend our previous translation d−e from IL to IMELL with dAe def= dAe, we
get stuck in the case of R. This is because we need to establish the inference ′ in Figure 5,
which means that we have to be able to obtain a derivation of form !dΓe ` dAe from
that of !dΓe ` dAe in IMELL.
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...
Γ ` A
R
Γ ` A
in LJ
 d−e //
...
!dΓe ` dAe
′
!dΓe ` dAe
in IMELL
Figure 5 Translation for the case of R.
(p ⊃ q),p ` q
R
(p ⊃ q),p ` q
Figure 6 Valid inference in LJ.
!(!p( q), !p ` q
R!(!p( q), !p ` q
Figure 7 Invalid inference in IMELL.
Syntactic category
Formulae A,B,C ::= p | A( B | !A | ! A
Inference rule
AxA ` A
Γ ` A A,Γ′ ` B
Cut
Γ,Γ′ ` B
Γ,A ` B
(RΓ ` A( B
Γ ` A Γ′,B ` C
(L
Γ,Γ′,A( B ` C
! ∆, !Γ ` A
!R
! ∆, !Γ ` !A
Γ,A ` B
!LΓ, !A ` B
! ∆ ` A
! R
! ∆ `! A
Γ,A ` B
! LΓ,! A ` B
Γ ` B !WΓ, !A ` B
Γ, !A, !A ` B
!CΓ, !A ` B
Γ ` B
! WΓ,! A ` B
Γ,! A,! A ` B
! CΓ,! A ` B
Figure 8 Definition of IMELL! .
However, the inference ′ is invalid in IMELL in general, because there exists a
counterexample. First, the inference shown in Figure 6 is valid, and the judgment (p ⊃
q),p ` q is indeed derivable in LJ. However, the corresponding inference via d−e is
invalid as Figure 7 shows. In the figure, the judgments correspond to those in Figure 6 via
d−e, but the inference R in Figure 7 is invalid in IMELL due to the side-condition of
R. Even worse, we can see that the judgment !(!p( q), !p ` q is itself underivable
in IMELL2.
Moreover, one may think the other cases that we extend the original translation d−e
from IL to IMELL with dAe def= !dAe or dAe def= !dAe will work to obtain a faithful
translation. However, the judgment p ` p will be a counter-example in either case.
All in all, the problem of the naive combination formulated as IMELL intuitively came
from an undesirable interaction between the right rules of the two modalities:
!Γ ` A !R!Γ ` !A
Γ ` A
R
Γ ` A
Each of these rules has a side-condition: the conclusion !A in !R must be derived from the
modalized context !Γ, and similarly for A in R. This makes it hard to obtain a faithful
S4-version of Girard translation for this naive extension.
3.2 Modal linear logic
We propose a modal linear logic to give a faithful S4-version of Girard translation from IS4.
First of all, the problem we have identified essentially came from the fact that there is no
relationship between ‘!’ and ‘’, and hence the side-conditions of !R and R do not hold
when we intuitively expect them to hold. Thus, we introduce a modality, ‘! ’ combining ‘!’
and ‘’, to solve this problem.
2 Precisely speaking, this can be shown as a consequence of the cut-elimination theorem of IMELL, and
the theorem was shown in the authors’ previous work [6].
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dAe
dpe def= p, dA ⊃ Be def= (!dAe)( dBe, dAe def=! dAe
dΓe
dΓe def= {(x : dAe) | (x : A) ∈ Γ}
Figure 9 Definition of the S4-version of Girard translation.
Our modal linear logic, which is called IMELL! , is defined by a sequent calculus which
is given in Figure 8. As we mentioned, the formulae are defined as an extension of those of
IMELL with the ! -modality. A point is that the !-modality is still there with the ! -modality.
The ! -modality is defined so as to have properties of both ‘!’ and ‘’, but ‘!’ still behaves
similarly to IMELL. Therefore, all the intuitions of the inference rules except !R and ! R
should be clear. The rules !R and ! R reflect the “strength” between the modalities ‘!’ and
‘! ’. Indeed, ‘!’ and ‘! ’ satisfy the S4 axiomata and ‘! ’ is stronger than ‘!’.
I Example 3. The following hold:
1. ` !A( A and `! A( A
2. ` !(A( B)(!A(!B and `! (A( B)(! A(! B
3. ` !A(!!A and `! A(! ! A
4. `! A(!A but 0 !A(! A
I Remark 4. In Example 3, the first three represent the so-called S4 axiomata: T, K, and 4.
The last one represents the strength of the two modalities. Actually, assuming the !-modality
and the ! -modality to satisfy the S4 axiomata and the “strength” axiom `! A (!A is
enough to characterize our modal linear logic (see Section 5 for more details).
The cut-elimination theorem for IMELL! is shown similarly to the case of IMELL, and
hence IMELL! is consistent. The addition of ‘! ’ causes no problems in the proof.
I Definition 5 (Cut-degree and degree). For an application of Cut in a proof, its cut-degree
is defined to be the number of logical connectives in the cut-formula. The degree of a proof is
defined to be the maximal cut-degree of the proof (and 0 if there is no application of Cut).
I Theorem 6 (Cut-elimination). The rule Cut in IMELL! is admissible, i.e., if Γ ` A is
derivable, then there is a derivation of the same judgment without any applications of Cut.
Proof. We follow the proof for propositional linear logic by Lincoln et al. [9]. To show the
admissibility of Cut, we consider the admissibility of the following cut rules:
Γ ` !A Γ′, (!A)n ` B
!CutΓ,Γ′ ` B
Γ `! A Γ′, (! A)n ` B
! CutΓ,Γ′ ` B
where (C )n denotes the multiset that has n occurrences of C and n is assumed to be positive
as a side-condition; and Γ′ in !Cut (resp. in ! Cut) is supposed to contain no formulae of
form !A (resp. ! A). The cut-degrees of !Cut and ! Cut are defined similarly to that of Cut.
Then, all the three rules (Cut, !Cut, ! Cut) are shown to be admissible by simultaneous
induction on the lexicographic complexity 〈δ, h〉, where δ is the degree of the assumed
derivation and h is its height. See the appendix for details of the proof. J
I Corollary 7 (Consistency). IMELL! is consistent, i.e., there exists an underivable judgment.
Then, we can define an S4-version of Girard translation as in Figure 9, and it can be
justified by the following theorem, which is readily shown by induction on the derivation.
I Theorem 8 (Soundness). If ∆,Γ ` A in LJ, then ! d∆e, !dΓe ` dAe in IMELL! .
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Syntactic category
Types A,B,C ::= p | A( B | !A | ! A
Terms M,N,L ::= x | λx : A.M | M N | !M | ! M
| let !x = M in N | let ! x = M in N
Reduction rule
(β () (λx : A.M ) N  M [x := N ]
(β!) let !x =!N in M  M [x := N ]
(β ! ) let ! x =! N in M  M [x := N ]
Typing rule
LinAx∆; Γ; x : A ` x : A !Ax∆; Γ, x : A; ∅ ` x : A
! Ax∆, x : A; Γ; ∅ ` x : A
∆; Γ; Σ, x : A ` M : B
( I∆; Γ; Σ ` λx : A.M : A( B
∆; Γ; Σ ` M : A( B ∆; Γ; Σ′ ` N : A
(E
∆; Γ; Σ,Σ′ ` M N : B
∆; Γ; ∅ ` M : A
!I∆; Γ; ∅ ` !M :!A
∆; Γ; Σ ` M :!A ∆; Γ, x : A; Σ′ ` N : B
!E
∆; Γ; Σ,Σ′ ` let !x = M in N : B
∆; ∅; ∅ ` M : A
! I∆; Γ; ∅ `! M :! A
∆; Γ; Σ ` M :! A ∆, x : A; Γ; Σ′ ` N : B
! E
∆; Γ; Σ,Σ′ ` let ! x = M in N : B
Figure 10 Definition of λ! .
4 Curry–Howard correspondence
In this section, we give a computational interpretation for our modal linear logic through
the Curry–Howard correspondence and establish the corresponding S4-version of Girard
translation for the modal linear logic in terms of typed λ-calculus.
4.1 Typed λ-calculus for the intuitionistic modal linear logic
We introduce λ! (pronounced by “lambda bangbox”) that is a typed λ-calculus corresponding
to the modal linear logic under the Curry–Howard correspondence. The calculus λ! can
be seen as an integration of λ of Pfenning and Davies and the linear λ-calculus for dual
intuitionistic linear logic of Barber [2]. The rules of λ! are designed considering the “necessity”
of modal logic and the “linearity” of linear logic, and formally defined as in Figure 10.
The structure of types are exactly the same as that of formulae in IMELL! . Terms are
defined as an extension of the simply-typed λ-calculus with the following: the terms !M and
let !x = M in N , which are a constructor and a destructor for types !A, respectively; and the
terms ! M and let ! x = M in N , which are those for types ! A similarly. Note that the
variable x in let !x = M in N and let ! x = M in N is supposed to be bound.
A (type) context is defined by the same way as λ and a (type) judgment consists of three
contexts, a term and a type, written as ∆; Γ; Σ ` M : A. These three contexts of a judgment
∆; Γ; Σ ` M : A have the following intuitive meaning: (1) ∆ implicitly represents a context
for modalized types of form ! A; (2) Γ implicitly represents a context for modalized types of
form A; (3) Σ represents an ordinary context but its elements must be used linearly.
The intuitive meanings of the typing rules are as follows. Each of the first three rules is a
variable rule depending on the context’s kind. It is allowed for the ∆-part and the Γ-part
to weaken the antecedent in these rules, but is not for the Σ-part since it must satisfy the
linearity condition. The rules ( I and ( E are for the type (, and again, the ( E is
designed to satisfy the linearity. The remaining rules are for types !A and ! A.
The reduction  is defined to be the least compatible relation on terms generated by
(β(), (β!), and (β ! ). The multistep reduction  + is defined as in the case of λ.
Then, we can show the subject reduction and the strong normalization of λ! as follows.
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I Lemma 9 (Substitution).
1. If ∆; Γ; Σ, x : A ` M : B and ∆; Γ; Σ′ ` N : A, then ∆; Γ; Σ,Σ′ ` M [x := N ] : B;
2. If ∆; Γ, x : A; Σ ` M : B and ∆; Γ; ∅ ` N : A, then ∆; Γ; Σ ` M [x := N ] : B;
3. If ∆, x : A; Γ; Σ ` M : B and ∆; ∅; ∅ ` N : A, then ∆; Γ; Σ ` M [x := N ] : B.
I Theorem 10 (Subject reduction). If ∆; Γ; Σ ` M : A and M  N , then ∆; Γ; Σ ` N : A.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ∆; Γ; Σ ` M : A together with Lemma 9. J
I Theorem 11 (Strong normalization). For well-typed term M , there are no infinite reduction
sequences starting from M .
Proof. By embedding to a typed λ-calculus of the (!,()-fragment of dual intuitionistic linear
logic, named λ!,(, which is shown to be strongly normalizing by Ohta and Hasegawa [16].
The details are in the appendix, but the intuition is described as follows. First, for
every well-typed term M , we define the term (M )‡ by replacing the occurrences of ! N and
let ! x = N in L in M with !(N )‡ and let !x = (N )‡ in (L)‡, respectively. Then, we can show
that (M )‡ is typable in λ!,(, because the structure of ‘! ’ collapses to that of ‘!’, and that
the embedding (−)‡ preserves reductions. Therefore, λ! is strongly normalizing. J
As we mentioned, we can view that λ! is indeed a typed λ-calculus for the intuitionistic
modal linear logic. A natural deduction that corresponds to λ! is obtained as the “logical-part”
of the calculus, and we can show that the natural deduction is equivalent to IMELL! .
I Definition 12 (Natural deduction). A natural deduction for modal linear logic, called NJ! ,
is defined to be one that is extracted from λ! by erasing term annotations.
I Fact 13 (Curry–Howard correspondence). There is a one-to-one correspondence between
NJ! and λ! , which preserves provability/typability and proof-normalizability/reducibility.
I Lemma 14 (Judgmental reflection). The following hold in NJ! .
1. ∆; Γ; Σ, !A ` B if and only if ∆; Γ,A; Σ ` B;
2. ∆; Γ; Σ,! A ` B if and only if ∆,A; Γ; Σ ` B.
I Theorem 15 (Equivalence). ∆; Γ; Σ ` A in NJ! if and only if ! ∆, !Γ,Σ ` A in IMELL! .
Proof. By straightforward induction. Lemma 14 is used to show the if-part. J
4.2 Embedding from the modal λ-calculus by Pfenning and Davies
We give a translation from Pfenning and Davies’ λ to our λ! . We also show that the
translation preserves the reductions of λ, and thus it can be seen as the S4-version of Girard
translation on the level of proofs through the Curry–Howard correspondence.
To give the translation, we introduce two meta λ-terms in λ! to encode the function
space ⊃ of λ. The simulation of reduction of (λx : A.M ) N in λ can be shown readily.
IDefinition 16. LetM and N be terms such that ∆; Γ, x : A; Σ ` M : B and ∆; Γ; ∅ ` N : A.
Then, λx : A.M and M@N are defined as the terms λy :!A.let !x = y in M and M (!N ),
respectively, where y is chosen to be fresh, i.e., it is a variable satisfying y 6∈ (FV(M) ∪ {x}).
I Lemma 17 (Derivable full-function space). The following rules are derivable in λ! :
∆; Γ, x : A; Σ ` M : B
∆; Γ; Σ ` (λx : A.M ) :!A( B
∆; Γ; Σ ` M :!A( B ∆; Γ; ∅ ` N : A
∆; Γ; Σ ` M@N : B
Moreover, it holds that (λx : A.M )@N  + M [x := N ] in λ! .
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dAe dpe def= p
dA ⊃ Be def= !dAe( dBe
dAe def=! dAe
dΓe
dΓe def= {(x : dAe) | (x : A) ∈ Γ}
T dMe T dxe def= x
T dλx : A.Me def= λx : dAe.T dMe
T dM Ne def= T dMe@T dNe
T dMe def=! T dMe
T dletx = M in Ne def= let ! x = T dMe in T dNe
Figure 11 Definitions of the S4-version of Girard translation in term of typed λ-calculus.
Together with the above meta λ-terms λx : A.M and M@N , we can define the translation
from λ into λ! and show that it preserves typability and reducibility.
I Definition 18 (Translation). The translation from λ to λ! is defined to be the triple of
the type/context/term translations dAe, dΓe, and T dMe defined in Figure 11.
I Theorem 19 (Embedding). λ can be embedded into λ! , i.e., the following hold:
1. If ∆; Γ ` M : A in λ, then d∆e; dΓe; ∅ ` T dMe : dAe in λ! .
2. If M  M ′ in λ, then T dMe + T dM ′e in λ! .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ∆; Γ ` M : A and M  M ′ in λ, respectively. J
From the logical point of view, Theorem 19.1 can be seen as another S4-version of
Girard translation (in the style of natural deduction) that corresponds to Theorem 8; and
Theorem 19.2 gives a justification that the S4-version of Girard translation is correct with
respect to the level of proofs, i.e., it preserves proof-normalizations as well as provability.
5 Axiomatization of modal linear logic
We give an axiomatic characterization of the intuitionistic modal linear logic. To do so, we
define a typed combinatory logic, called CL! , which can be seen as a Hilbert-style deductive
system of modal linear logic through the Curry–Howard correspondence. In this section, we
only aim to provide the equivalence between NJ! and the Hilbert-style, while CL! satisfies
several desirable properties, e.g., the subject reduction and the strong normalizability.
The definition of CL! is given in Figure 12. The set of types has the same structure
as that in λ! . A term is either a variable, a combinator, a necessitated term by ‘!’, or a
necessitated term by ‘! ’. The notions of (type) context and (type) judgment are defined
similarly to those of λ! .
Every combinator c has its type as defined in the list in the figure, and is denoted by
typeof(c). Then, the typing rules are described as follows: Ax and MP are the standard
rules, which logically correspond to an axiom rule of the set of axiomata, and modus ponens,
respectively. The others are defined by the same way as in λ! .
The reduction  of combinators is defined to be the least compatible relation on terms
generated by the reduction rules listed in the figure.
I Remark 20. CL! can be seen as an extension of linear combinatory algebra of Abramsky
et al. [1] with the ! -modality, or equivalently, a linear-logical reconstruction of Pfenning’s
modally-typed combinatory logic [17]. The combinators T!, D!, 4! represent the S4 axiomata
for the !-modality, and similarly, T!, D!, 4! represent those for the ! -modality. E is the
only one combinator to characterize the strength between the two modalities.
As we defined NJ! from λ! , we can define the Hilbert-style deductive system (with open
assumptions) for the intuitionistic modal linear logic via CL! .
FSCD 2019
20:10 A Linear-Logical Reconstruction of Intuitionistic Modal Logic S4
Syntactic category
Types A,B,C ::= p | A( B | !A | ! A
Terms M,N,L ::= x | c | !M | ! M
Typing rule
(c is a combinator)
Ax∆; Γ; ∅ ` c : typeof(c)
∆; Γ; Σ ` M : A( B ∆; Γ; Σ′ ` N : A
MP
∆; Γ; Σ,Σ′ ` M N : B
LinAx∆; Γ; x : A ` x : A !Ax∆; Γ, x : A; ∅ ` x : A
! Ax∆, x : A; Γ; ∅ ` x : A
∆; Γ; ∅ ` M : A
!∆; Γ; ∅ ` !M :!A
∆; ∅; ∅ ` M : A
!∆; Γ; ∅ `! M :! A
Combinator
` I : A( A
` B : (B ( C )( (A( B)( A( C
` C : (A( B ( C )( B ( A( C
` Sδ : (δA( B ( C )( (δA( B)( δA( C
` Kδ : A( δB ( A
` Wδ : (δA( δA( B)( δA( B
` Tδ : δA( A
` Dδ : δ(A( B)( δA( δB
` 4δ : δA( δδA
` E :! A(!A
where δ ∈ {!,! }
Reduction
I M  M
B M N L  M (N L)
C M N L  M L N
Sδ M N (δL)  M (δL) (N (δL))
Kδ M (δN )  M
Wδ M (δN )  M (δN ) (δN )
Tδ (δM )  M
Dδ (δM ) (δN ) δ(M N )
4δ (δM )  δδM
E ! M  !M
where δ ∈ {!,! }
Figure 12 Definition of CL! .
I Definition 21 (Hilbert-style). A Hilbert-style deductive system for modal linear logic, called
HJ! , is defined to be one that is extracted from CL! by erasing term annotations.
I Fact 22 (Curry–Howard correspondnece). There is a one-to-one correspondence between
HJ! and CL! , which preserves provability/typability and proof-normalizability/reducibility.
The deduction theorem of HJ! can be obtained as a consequence of the so-called bracket
abstraction of CL! through Fact 22, which allows us to show the equivalence between HJ!
and NJ! . Therefore, the modal linear logic is indeed axiomatized by HJ! .
I Theorem 23 (Deduction theorem).
1. If ∆; Γ; Σ, x : A ` M : B, then ∆; Γ; Σ ` (λ∗x.M ) : (A( B);
2. If ∆; Γ, x : A; Σ ` M : B, then ∆; Γ; Σ ` (λ!∗x.M ) : (!A( B);
3. If ∆, x : A; Γ; Σ ` M : B, then ∆; Γ; Σ ` (λ!∗x.M ) : (! A( B).
where (λ∗x.M ), (λ!∗x.M ), (λ
!
∗x.M ) are bracket abstraction operations that take a variable x
and a CL! -term M and returns a CL! -term, and the definitions are given in the appendix.
Proof. By induction on the derivation. The proof is just a type-checking of the result of the
bracket abstraction operations. J
I Theorem 24 (Equivalence). ∆; Γ; Σ ` A in HJ! if and only if ∆; Γ; Σ ` A in NJ! .
Proof. By straightforward induction. We use Theorem 23 and Fact 22 to show the if-part. J
I Corollary 25. IMELL! , NJ! , and HJ! are equivalent with respect to provability.
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Syntactic category
Formulae A,B,C ::= p | p⊥ | A⊗ B | A ` B | !A | ?A | ! A | ♦? A
Inference rule
Ax
` A⊥,A
` Γ,A ` A⊥,Γ′
Cut
` Γ,Γ′
` Γ,A ` Γ′,B
⊗
` Γ,Γ′,A⊗ B
` Γ,A,B `` Γ,A ` B
`♦? ∆, ?Γ,A
!`♦? ∆, ?Γ, !A
` Γ,A
?` Γ, ?A
`♦? ∆,A
!`♦? ∆,! A
` Γ,A
♦?` Γ,♦? A
` Γ ?W` Γ, ?A
` Γ, ?A, ?A
?C` Γ, ?A
` Γ ♦? W` Γ,♦? A
` Γ,♦? A,♦? A
♦? C` Γ,♦? A
Figure 13 Definition of CMELL! .
6 Geometry of Interaction Machine
In this section, we show a dynamic semantics, called context semantics, for the modal linear
logic in the style of geometry of interaction machine [10, 11]. As in the usual linear logic,
we first define a notion of proof net and then define the machine as a token-passing system
over those proof nets. Thanks to the simplicity of our logic, the definitions are mostly
straightforward extension of those for classical MELL (CMELL).
6.1 Sequent calculus for classical modal linear logic
We define a sequent calculus of classical modal linear logic, called CMELL! . The reason why
we define it in the classical setting is for ease of defining the proof nets in the latter part.
Figure 13 shows the definition of CMELL! . The set of formulae are defined as an
extension of CMELL-formulae with the two modalities ‘! ’ and ‘♦?’. A dual formula of A,
written A⊥, is defined by the standard dual formulae in CMELL along with (! A)⊥ def=♦? (A⊥)
and (♦? A)⊥ def=! (A⊥). Here, the ♦? -modality is the dual of the ! -modality by definition, and
it can be seen as an integration of the ?-modality and the ♦-modality. The linear implication
A( B is defined as A⊥ ` B as usual. The inference rules are defined as a simple extension
of IMELL! to the classical setting in the style of “one-sided” sequent.
Then, the cut-elimination theorem for CMELL! can be shown similarly to the case of
IMELL! , and we can see that there exists a trivial embedding from IMELL! to CMELL! .
I Theorem 26 (Cut-elimination). The rule Cut in CMELL! is admissible.
I Theorem 27 (Embedding). If Γ ` A in IMELL! , then ` Γ⊥,A in CMELL! .
6.2 Proof-nets formalization
First, we define proof structures for CMELL! . The proof nets are then defined to be those
proof structures satisfying a condition called correctness criterion. Intuitively, a proof net
corresponds to an (equivalence class of) proof in CMELL! .
I Definition 28. A node is one of the graph-theoretic node shown in Figure 14 equipped
with CMELL! types on the edges. They are all directed from top to bottom: for example,
the ` node has two incoming edges and one outgoing edge. A !-node (resp. ! -node) has one
outgoing edge typed by !A (resp. ! A) and arbitrarily many (possibly zero) outgoing edges
typed by ?Ai and ♦?Bi (resp. ♦?Ai).
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(!, ?)-modalities
?c ?w
?A
?A?A
ax
A⊥ A cut ⊗ `A A
⊥ A B
A⊗B
A B
A`B
Multiplicatives
?A
!
?A
?d
A
?A1 ?An!A . . .
(! ,♦? )-modalities
♦? c ♦? w
♦? A
♦? A♦? A
♦? A
!
♦? A
♦? d
A
♦? A1 ♦? An! A . . .
♦? B1 ♦? Bm. . .
!A
S
! ? ♦?
?Γ ♦? ∆
Box notation for ! node
Figure 14 Nodes of proof net and box notation.
A proof structure is a finite directed graph that satisfies the following conditions:
each edge is with a type that matches the types specified by the nodes (in Figure 14) it is
connected to;
some edges may not be connected to any node (called dangling edges). Those dangling
edges and also the types on those edges are called the conclusions of the structure;
the graph is associated with a total map from all the !-nodes and ! -nodes in it to proof
structures called the contents of the !/! -nodes. The map satisfies that the types of the
conclusions of a !-node (resp. ! -node) coincide with the conclusions of its content.
I Remark 29. Formally, a !-node (resp. a ! -node) and its content are distinctive objects and
they are not connected as a directed graph. Though, it is convenient to depict them as if the
!-node (resp. ! -node) represents a “box” filled with its content, as shown at the bottom-right
of Figure 14. We also depict multiple edges by an edge with a diagonal line. In what follows,
we adopt this “box” notation and multiple edges notation without explicit note.
I Definition 30. Given a proof structure S, a switching path is an undirected path on S
(meaning that the path is allowed to traverse an edge forward or backward) satisfying that on
each ` node, ?c node, and ♦? c node, the path uses at most one of the premises, and that the
path uses any edge at most once.
I Definition 31. The correctness criterion is the following condition: given a proof structure
S, switching paths of S and all contents of !-nodes, ! -nodes in S are all acyclic and connected.
A proof structure satisfying the correctness criterion is called a proof net.
As a counterpart of cut-elimination process in CMELL! , the notion of reduction is defined
for proof structures (and hence for proof nets): this intuition is made precise by Lemma 34
where (−)• is the translation from CMELL! to proof nets, whose definition is omitted here
since it is defined analogously to that of CMELL and CMELL proof net. The lemmata below
are naturally obtained by extending the case for CMELL since the ! -modality has mostly
the same logical structure as the !-modality.
I Definition 32. Reductions of proof structures are local graph reductions defined by the set
of rules depicted in Figure 15.
I Lemma 33. Let S → S′ be a reduction between proof structures. If S is a proof net (i.e.,
satisfies the correctness criterion), so is S′.
I Lemma 34. Let Π be a proof of `♦? ∆⊥, ?Γ⊥,Σ⊥,A and suppose that Π reduces to another
proof Π′. Then there is a sequence of reductions (Π)• →∗ (Π′)• between the proof nets.
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cut
?c
 
ax
cut  ⊗ `
cut
 cut cutA
AA⊥ A
A B A⊥ B⊥ A B A⊥ B⊥
?A⊥?A⊥
?A⊥ !A
S
! ?
?Γ ♦? ∆
cut
?w  
?A⊥ ?Γ
?w ♦?w
♦? ∆
cut
?d
cut
 
?A⊥
A⊥
A⊥
!A
S
! ?
?Γ ♦? ∆ !A
S
! ?
?Γ ♦? ∆
cut
?A⊥
cut
?A⊥
?c
?Γ ♦? ∆
♦? c
 
!A
S
! ?
?Γ ♦? ∆ !A
S
! ?
?Γ ♦? ∆
!A
S
?Γ ♦? ∆
!A
S1
! ?
?Γ1 ♦? ∆1 !B
S2
?
?Γ2 ♦? ∆2
cut
!?
?B⊥
!A
S1
! ?
?Γ1
♦? ∆1
!B
S2
?
?Γ2 ♦? ∆2cut
!?B⊥
?Γ1
?
?Γ2 ♦? ∆2
S
cut
♦? c
!
 
♦? A⊥♦? A⊥
♦? A⊥ ! A
♦? Γ
S
cut
♦? A⊥ ! A ♦? Γ
S
cut
♦? A⊥
! A ♦? Γ
♦? c
♦? Γ
S
cut
♦? A⊥ ! A
♦? Γ
♦?w
 
♦? Γ
♦?w
S
cut
♦? A⊥ ! A
♦? Γ
♦? d
A⊥
S
cut ♦? Γ
A⊥
A 
S
! A
♦? Γ1
S
! B
♦? Γ2
♦? B⊥
cut
S
! A ♦? Γ1
S
! B
♦? Γ2cut
♦? Γ2
 
♦? ♦?
♦? ♦?
♦?
♦? ♦?
♦? ♦?
♦?
♦?
♦? ♦?
♦?
♦?
♦? ♦?
♦?
♦?
♦?
♦?
! !
!
!
! !
!
!
Figure 15 Reduction rules.
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6.3 Computational interpretation
I Definition 35. A context is a triple (M,B,N ) where M,B,N are generated by the
following grammar:
M ::= ε | l.M | r.M B ::= ε | L.B | R.B | 〈B,B〉 | ? N ::= ε | L′.N | R′.N | 〈N ,N〉 | ?
The intuition of a context is an intermediate state while “evaluating” the proof net (and,
by translating into a proof net, a term in λ! ). The geometry of interaction machine calculates
the semantic value of a net by traversing the net from a conclusion to another; to traverse
the net in a “right way” (more precisely, in a way invariant under net reduction), the context
accumulates the information about the path that is already passed. Then, how the net is
traversed is defined by the notion of path over a proof net as we define below.
IDefinition 36. The extended dynamic algebra Λ∗ is a single-sorted Σ algebra that contains
0, 1, p, q, r, r′, s, s′, t, t′, d, d′ : Σ as constants, has an associative operator · : Σ×Σ→ Σ and
operators (−)∗ : Σ→ Σ, ! : Σ→ Σ, ! : Σ→ Σ, equipped with a formal sum +, and satisfies
the equations below. Hereafter, we write xy for x · y where x and y are metavariables over Σ.
0∗ =!0 = 0 1∗ =!1 = 1 0x = x0 = 0 1x = x1 = x
!(x)∗ =!(x∗) (xy)∗ = y∗x∗ (x∗)∗ = x !(x)!(y) =!(xy)
! (x) ! (y) =! (xy) p∗p = q∗q = 1 q∗p = p∗q = 0 r∗r = s∗s = 1
s∗r = r∗s = 0 d∗d = 1 t∗t = 1 p′∗p′ = q′∗q′ = 1
q′∗p′ = p′∗q′ = 0 r′∗r′ = s′∗s′ = 1 s′∗r′ = r′∗s′ = 0 d′∗d′ = 1
t′∗t′ = 1 !(x)r = r!(x) !(x)s = s!(x) !(x)t = t!!(x)
!(x)d = dx ! (x)r′ = r′ ! (x) ! (x)s′ = s′ ! (x) ! (x)t′ = t′ ! ! (x)
! (x)d′ = d′x x+ y = y + x x+ 0 = x (x+ y)z = xz + yz
z(x+ y) = zx+ zy (x+ y)∗ = x∗ + y∗ !(x+ y) =!x+!y ! (x+ y) =! x+ ! y
I Remark 37. The equations in the definition above are mostly the same as the standard
dynamic algebra Λ∗ [10, 11] except those equations concerning the symbols with ′ and the
operator ! , and their structures are analogous to those for ! operator. This again reflects
the fact that the logical structure of rules for ! is analogous to that of !.
I Definition 38. A label is an element of Λ∗ that is associated to edges of proof structures
as in Figure 16. Let S be a proof structure and TS be the set of edge traversals in the structure.
S is associated with a function w : TS → Λ∗ defined by w(e) = l (resp. l∗) if e is a forward
(resp. backward) traversal of an edge e and l is the label of the edge; w(e1e2) = w(e1)w(e2).
S
! ♦?
. . .
♦?
. . .
. . .
?c ?w
ax
cut ⊗ ` ?d
♦? c ♦?w ♦? d
S
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
1 1 1 1
p q p q r s
0
d
r′
0
s′ d′
t′ t′ t t t′ t′
! ? ? ♦?. . .♦?. . .
Figure 16 Labels on edges.
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I Definition 39. A walk over a proof structure S is an element of Λ∗ that is obtained by
concatenating labels along a graph-theoretic path over S such that the graph-theoretic path
does not traverse an edge forward (resp. backward) immediately after the same edge backward
(resp. forward); and does not traverse a premise of one of ⊗,`, c node and another premise
of the same node immediately after that. A path is a walk that is not proved to be equal to 0.
A path is called maximal if it starts and finishes at a conclusion.
The intuition of the notion of path is that a path is a “correct way” of traversing a proof
net, in the sense that any path is preserved before and after a reduction. All the other walks
that are not paths will be broken, which is represented by the constant 0 of Λ∗. Then, we
obtain a context semantics from paths in the following way.
I Definition 40. Given a monomial path a, its action JaK : Σ ⇀ Σ on contexts is defined as
follows. We define J1K as the identity mapping on contexts. There is no definition of J0K.
The Jf∗K is the inverse translation, i.e., JfK−1. The transformer of the composition of a and
b is defined as JabK(m) def= JaK(JbK(m)). For the other labels, the interpretation are defined as
follows where exponential morphisms ! and ! are defined by the meta-level pattern matchings:
JpK(M,B,N ) def= (l.M,B,N ) JqK(M,B,N ) def= (r.M,B,N )
JrK(M,B,N ) def= (M, L.B,N ) JsK(M,B,N ) def= (M, R.B,N )
JtK(M, 〈B1, 〈B2,B3〉〉,N )
def= (M, 〈〈B1,B2〉,B3〉,N ) JdK(M,B,N )
def= (M, ?.B,N )
Jr′K(M,B,N ) def= (M,B, L′.N ) Js′K(M,B,N ) def= (M,B, R′.N )
Jt′K(M,B, 〈N1, 〈N2,N3〉〉)
def= (M,B, 〈〈N1,N2〉,N3〉) Jd′K(M,B,N )
def= (M,B, ?.N )
J!(f)K(M, 〈B1,B2〉,N )
def= let (M′,B′2,N ′) = JfK(M,B2,N ) in (M′, 〈B1,B′2〉,N ′)
J! (f)K(M,B, 〈N1,N2〉)
def= let (M′,B′,N ′2) = JfK(M,B,N2) in (M′,B′, 〈N1,N ′2〉)
Given a path a, its action JaK : Σ ⇀ M(Σ) is defined by the rules above (regarding the
codomain as a multiset) and Ja+ bK(m) = (JaK(m)) ] (JbK(m)) where ] is the multiset sum.
I Remark 41. In Mackie’s work [10], the multiset in the codomain is not used since the main
interest of his work is on terms of a base type: in that setting any proof net corresponding to
a term has an execution formula that is monomial. In general, this style of context semantics
is slightly degenerated compared to Girard’s original version and its successors because the
information of “current position” is dropped from the definition of contexts.
I Definition 42. Let S be a closed proof net and χ be the set of maximal paths between
conclusions of S. The execution formula is defined by EX (S) = Σφ∈χφ where the RHS is the
sum of all paths in χ. The context semantics of S is defined to be JEX (S)K : Σ ⇀M(Σ).
I Definition 43. Let M be a closed well-typed term in λ! . The context semantics of M
is defined to be J(M)†K, where (−)† is a straightforward translation from λ! -terms to proof
nets, defined by constructing proof nets from λ! -derivations as in Figure 17.
I Lemma 44. Let S be a closed proof net and S′ be its normal form. Then JSK = JS′K.
The lemma is proved through two auxiliary lemmata below.
I Lemma 45. Let φ be a path from a conclusion of a closed net S ending at a node a.
Let (M′,B′,N ′) = JφK(M, ε, ε). The height of B′ (resp. N ′) matches with the number of
exponential (resp. necessitation) boxes containing the node a.
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LinAx
∆; Γ;x : A ` x : A !Ax∆; Γ, x : A; ∅ ` x : A 
! Ax
∆, x : A; Γ; ∅ ` x : A
Π
∆; Γ; Σ, x : A ` M : B
( I
∆; Γ; Σ ` λx : A.M : A( B
Π1
∆; Γ; Σ ` M : A( B
Π2
∆; Γ; Σ′ ` N : A
( E
∆; Γ; Σ,Σ′ ` M N : B
Π
∆; Γ; ∅ ` M : A
!I
∆; Γ; ∅ ` !M :!A
Π1
∆; Γ; Σ ` M : !A
Π2
∆; Γ, x : A; Σ′ ` N : B
!E
∆; Γ; Σ,Σ′ ` let !x = M inN : B
Π
∆; ∅; ∅ ` M : A
! I
∆; Γ; ∅ `! M :! A
Π1
∆; Γ; Σ ` M :! A
Π2
∆, x : A; Γ; Σ′ ` N : B
! E
∆; Γ; Σ,Σ′ ` let ! x = M inN : B
?Γ⊥
?w♦? w
♦? ∆⊥
ax
A⊥ A
?Γ⊥
?w♦? w
♦? ∆⊥
ax
A
A⊥
?d
?A⊥
?Γ⊥
?w♦? w
♦? ∆⊥
ax
A
A⊥
♦? d
♦? A⊥
(Π)†
?Γ⊥♦? ∆⊥ Σ⊥
A⊥ B
À( B
(Π1)
†
?Γ⊥♦? ∆⊥ Σ⊥
(Π2)
†
?Γ⊥♦? ∆⊥ Σ′⊥ ax
B⊥ B
A⊥
⊗
cut
A( B
?c
?Γ⊥
♦? c
♦? ∆⊥
!A
(Π)†
!?
?Γ⊥♦? ∆⊥ A
?Γ⊥♦? ∆⊥
! A
(Π)†
♦?
♦? ∆⊥ A
?Γ⊥♦? ∆⊥
♦? w
(Π1)
†
?Γ⊥♦? ∆⊥ Σ⊥
!A
(Π2)
†
?Γ⊥♦? ∆⊥ Σ′⊥ B?A⊥
cut♦? c
♦? ∆⊥
?c
?Γ⊥
(Π1)
†
?Γ⊥♦? ∆⊥ Σ⊥
! A
(Π2)
†
?Γ⊥♦? ∆⊥ Σ′⊥ B♦? A⊥
cut♦? c
♦? ∆⊥
?c
?Γ⊥
♦?
!
Figure 17 Translation from λ! to CMELL! proof nets.
Proof. By spectating the rules of actions above: the height of stacks only changes at doors
of a box. J
I Lemma 46. Let φ be a path inside a box of a closed net S. JφK(M, σ.B, τ.N ) is in the
form (M′, σ′.B, τ.N ).
Proof. Again, by spectating the rules of actions. J
I Theorem 47. If a closed term M in λ! is typable and M  M ′, then J(M)†K = J(M ′)†K.
I Remark 48. This notion of context semantics inherently captures the “dynamics” of
computation, and indeed Mackie exploited [10, 11] the character to implement a compiler, in
the level of machine code, for PCF. In this paper we do not cover such a concrete compiler,
but the definition of J−K can be seen as “context transformers” of virtual machine that is
mathematically rigorous enough to model the computation of λ! (and hence of λ).
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7 Related work
7.1 Linear-logical reconstruction of modal logic
The work on translations from modal logic to linear logic goes back to Martini and Masini [13].
They proposed a translation from classical S4 (CS4) to full propositional linear logic by
means of the Grisin–Ono translation. However, their work only discusses provability.
The most similar work to ours is a “linear analysis” of CS4 by Schellinx [20], in which
Girard translation from CS4 with respect to proofs is proposed. He uses a bi-colored
linear logic, a subsystem of multicolored linear logic by Danos et al. [4], called 2-LL, for a
target calculus of the translation. It has two pairs of exponentials 〈!
0
, ?
0
〉 and 〈!
1
, ?
1
〉, called
subexponentials following the terminology by Nigam and Miller [14], with the following rules:
!
1
Γ, !
0
Γ′ ` A, ?
1
∆, ?
0
∆′
!
0
R
!
1
Γ, !
0
Γ′ ` !
0
A, ?
1
∆, ?
0
∆′
!
1
Γ ` A, ?
1
∆
!
1
R
!
1
Γ ` !
1
A, ?
1
∆
These rules have, while they are defined in the classical setting, essentially the same structure
to what we defined as !R and ! R for IMELL! , respectively.
To mention the difference between the results of Schellinx and ours, his work has
investigated only in terms of proof theory. Neither a typed λ-calculus nor a Geometry of
Interaction interpretation was given. However, even so, he already gave a reduction-preserving
Girard translation for the sequent calculi of CS4 and 2-LL, and his linear decoration (cf.
[20, 4]) allows us to obtain the cut-elimination theorem for CS4 as a corollary of that of
2-LL. Thus, it should be interesting to investigate a relationship between his work and ours.
Furthermore, there also exist two uniform logical frameworks that can encode various
logics including IS4 and CS4. One is the work by Nigam et al. [15] which based on Nigam
and Miller’s linear-logical framework with subexponentials and on the notion of focusing
by Andreoli. The other work is adjoint logic by Pruiksma et al. [19] which based on, again,
subexponentials, and the so-called LNL model for intuitionistic linear logic by Benton. While
our present work is still far from the two works, it seems fruitful to take our discussion into
their frameworks to give linear-logical computational interpretations for various logics.
7.2 Computation of modal logic and its relation to metaprogramming
Computational interpretations of modal logic have been considered not only for intuitionistic
S4 but also for various logics, including the modal logics K, T, K4, and GL, and a few
constructive temporal logics (cf. the survey by Kavvos in [8]). This field of modal logics is
known to be connected to “metaprogramming” in the theory of programming languages and
has been substantially studied. One of the studies is (multi-)staged computation (cf. [22]),
which is a programming paradigm that supports Lisp-like quasi-quote, unquote, and eval.
The work of λ by Davies and Pfenning [5] is actually one of logical investigations of it.
Furthermore, the multi-stage programming is not a mere theory but has “real” implemen-
tations such as MetaML [22] and MetaOCaml (cf. a survey in [3]) in the style of functional
programming languages. Some core calculi of these implementations are formalized as type
systems (e.g. [21, 3]) and investigated from the logical point of view (e.g. [24]).
8 Conclusion
We have presented a linear-logical reconstruction of the intuitionistic modal logic S4, by
establishing the modal linear logic with the ! -modality and the S4-version of Girard
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translation from IS4. The translation from IS4 to the modal linear logic is shown to be
correct with respect to the level of proofs, through the Curry–Howard correspondence.
While the proof-level Girard translation for modal logic is already proposed by Schellinx,
our typed λ-calculus λ! and its Geometry of Interaction Machine (GoIM) are novel. Also,
the significance of our formalization is its simplicity. All we need to establish the linear-logical
reconstruction of modal logic is the ! -modality, an integration of !-modality and -modality,
that gives the structure of modal logic into linear logic. Thanks to the simplicity, our
λ-calculus and the GoIM can be obtained as simple extensions of existing works.
As a further direction, we plan to enrich our framework to cover other modal logics such
as K, T, and K4, following the work of contextual modal calculi by Kavvos [8]. Moreover,
reinvestigating of the modal-logical foundation for multi-stage programming by Tsukada and
Igarashi [24] via our methods and extending Mackie’s GoIM for PCF [11] to the modal-logical
setting seem to be interesting from the viewpoint of programming languages.
Lastly, we have also left a semantical study for modal linear logic with respect to
the validity. At the present stage, we think that we could give a sound-and-complete
characterization of modal linear logic by an integration of Kripke semantics of modal logic
and phase semantics of linear logic, but details will be studied in a future paper.
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A Appendix
A.1 Cut-elimination theorem for the intuitionistic modal linear logic
In this section, we give a complete proof of the cut-elimination theorem of IMELL! .
I Theorem 49 (Cut-elimination). The rule Cut in IMELL! is admissible, i.e., if Γ ` A is
derivable, then there is a derivation of the same judgment without any applications of Cut.
Proof. As we mentioned in the body, we will show the following rules are admissible.
Γ ` !A Γ′, (!A)n ` B
!CutΓ,Γ′ ` B
Γ `! A Γ′, (! A)n ` B
! CutΓ,Γ′ ` B
The admissibility of Cut, !Cut, ! Cut are shown by simultaneous induction on the derivation
of Γ ` A with the lexicographic complexity 〈δ, h〉, where δ is the degree of the assumed
derivation and h is its height. Therefore, it is enough to show that for every application of
cuts, one of the following hold: (1) it can be reduced to a cut with a smaller cut-degree; (2)
it can be reduced to a cut with a smaller height; (3) it can be eliminated immediately.
In what follows, we will explain the admissibility of each cut rule separately although the
actual proofs are done simultaneously.
The admissibility of Cut. We show that every application of the rule Cut whose cut-degree
is maximal is eliminable. Thus, consider an application of Cut in the derivation:
Π0
Γ ` A
Π1
Γ′,A ` B
CutΓ,Γ′ ` B
such that its cut-degree is maximal and its height is minimal (comparing to the other
applications whose cut-degree is maximal). The proof proceeds by case analysis on Π0.
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Π0 ends with Cut. In this case the derivation is as follows:
...
Γ0 ` C
...
Γ1,C ` A CutΓ0,Γ1 ` A
Π1
Γ′,A ` B
CutΓ0,Γ1,Γ′ ` B
Since the bottom application of Cut was chosen to have the maximal cut-degree and
the minimum height, the cut-degree of the above is less than that of the bottom.
Therefore, the derivation can be translated to the following:
...
Γ0 ` C
...
Γ1,C ` A
Π1
Γ′,A ` B
I.H.
Γ1,C ,Γ′ ` B
I.H.
Γ0,Γ1,Γ′ ` B
Π0 ends with (R. In this case, the derivation is as follows:
...
Γ,A0 ` A1
(RΓ ` A0 ( A1
Π1
Γ′,A0 ( A1 ` B CutΓ,Γ′ ` B
for some A0 and A1 such that A ≡ A0 ( A1. If the last step in Π1 is Ax, then the
result is obtained as Π0. If the last step in Π1 is(L, the derivation is as follows:
...
Γ,A0 ` A1
(RΓ ` A0 ( A1
...
Γ′ ` A0
...
Γ′′,A1 ` B
(LΓ′,Γ′′,A0 ( A1 ` B CutΓ,Γ′,Γ′′ ` B
which is translated to the following:
...
Γ′ ` A0
...
Γ,A0 ` A1
I.H.
Γ,Γ′ ` A1
...
Γ′′,A1 ` B
I.H.
Γ,Γ′,Γ′′ ` B
since the cut-degrees of A0 and A1 are less than that of A. The other cases can be
shown by simple commutative conversions.
Π0 ends with !R. This case is dealt as a special case of the case !R in !Cut.
Π0 ends with ! R. This case is dealt as a special case of the case ! R in ! Cut.
Π0 ends with the other rules. Easy.
The admissibility of !Cut. As in the case of Cut, consider an application of !Cut:
Π0
Γ ` !A
Π1
Γ′, (!A)n ` B
!CutΓ,Γ′ ` B
such that its cut-degree is maximal and its height is minimal. By case analysis on Π0.
Π0 ends with Ax. In this case the cut-elimination is done as follows:
!A ` !A
Π1
Γ′, (!A)n ` B
!Cut!A,Γ′ ` B
Cut elim.=⇒
Π1
Γ′, (!A)n ` B
!C
Γ′, !A ` B
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Π0 ends with !R. In this case the derivation is as follows:
...
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` A !R
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` !A
Π1
Γ′, (!A)n ` B
!Cut
! Γ0, !Γ1,Γ′ ` B
Due to the side-condition of !R, we have to do case analysis on Π1 further as follows.
∗ Π1 ends with Cut. In this case the derivation is as follows:
Π0
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` !A
...
Γ′, (!A)k ` C
...
Γ′′, (!A)l,C ` B
CutΓ′,Γ′′, (!A)n ` B
!Cut
! Γ0, !Γ1,Γ′,Γ′′ ` B
where n = k+ l. We only deal with the case of k > 0 and l > 0, and the other cases
are easy. Then, the derivation can be translated to the following:
Π0
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` !A
...
Γ′, (!A)k ` C
I.H.
! Γ0, !Γ1,Γ′ ` C
Π0
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` !A
...
Γ′′, (!A)l,C ` B
I.H.
! Γ0, !Γ1,Γ′′,C ` B
I.H.
(! Γ0)2, (!Γ1)2,Γ′,Γ′′ ` B !C,! C
! Γ0, !Γ1,Γ′,Γ′′ ` B
since the cut-degree of !Cut is less than that of Cut from the assumption.
∗ Π1 ends with !L. If the formula introduced by !L is not the cut-formula, then it is
easy. For the other case, the derivation is as follows:
...
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` A !R
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` !A
...
Γ′, (!A)n−1,A ` B
!LΓ′, (!A)n ` B
!Cut
! Γ0, !Γ1,Γ′ ` B
which is translated to the following:
...
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` A
Π0
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` !A
...
Γ′, (!A)n−1,A ` B
I.H.
! Γ0, !Γ1,Γ′,A ` B
I.H.
(! Γ0)2, (!Γ1)2,Γ′ ` B !C,! C
! Γ0, !Γ1,Γ′ ` B
∗ Π1 ends with !C. If the formula introduced by !C is not the cut-formula, then it is
easy. For the other case, the cut-elimination is done as follows:
Π0
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` !A
...
Γ′, (!A)n+1 ` B
!CΓ′, (!A)n ` B
!Cut
! Γ0, !Γ1,Γ′ ` B
Cut elim.=⇒
Π0
! Γ0, !Γ1 ` !A
...
Γ′, (!A)n+1 ` B
I.H.
! Γ0, !Γ1,Γ′ ` B
Note that the whole proof has not been proceeding by induction on n, and hence
the number of occurrences of !A does not matter in this case.
∗ Π1 ends with the other rules. Easy.
Π0 ends with the other rules. Easy.
The admissibility of ! Cut. Similar to the case of !Cut. J
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Syntactic category
Types A,B,C ::= p | A( B | !A
Terms M,N,L ::= x | λx : A.M | M N | !M | let !x = M in N
Typing rule
LinAxΓ; x : A ` x : A !AxΓ, x : A; ∅ ` x : A
Γ; Σ, x : A ` M : B
( IΓ; Σ ` λx : A.M : A( B
Γ; Σ ` M : A( B Γ; Σ′ ` N : A
(E
Γ; Σ,Σ′ ` M N : B
Γ; ∅ ` M : A
!IΓ; ∅ ` !M :!A
Γ; Σ ` M :!A Γ, x : A; Σ′ ` N : B
!E
Γ; Σ,Σ′ ` let !x = M in N : B
Reduction rule
(λx : A.M ) N  M [x := N ]
λx : A.M x  M
let !x =!M in N  N [x := M ]
let !x = M inC[!x] C[M ]
(let !x = M in N ) L  let !x = M in N L
let !y = (let !x = M in N ) in L  let !x = M in let !y = N in L
λy : A.(let !x = M in N ) let !x = M inλy : A.N (if y 6∈ FV(M))
L (let !x = M in N ) let !x = M in L N
λz : A.(let !y = M in let !x = L in N ) let !x = L inλz : A.(let !y = M in N ) (if y 6∈ FV(L))
where C[−] is a linear context defined by the following grammar:
C ::= [−] | λx : A.C | C M | M C | let !x = C in M | let !x = M inC
Figure 18 Definition of λ!,( (some syntax are changed to fit the present paper’s notation).
A.2 Strong normalizability of the typed λ-calculus for modal linear
logic
We complete the proof of the strong normalization theorem for λ! . As we mentioned, this is
done by an embedding to a typed λ-calculus for the (!,()-fragment of dual intuitionistic
linear logic, studied by Ohta and Hasegawa [16], and shown to be strongly normalizing.
The calculus of Ohta and Hasegawa, named λ!,( here, is given in Figure 18. The syntax
and the typing rules can be read in the same way as (the (!, ()-fragment of) λ! . There are
somewhat many reduction rules in contrast to those of λ! , but these are due to the purpose
of Ohta and Hasegawa to consider η-rules and commutative conversions. The different sets
of reduction rules do not cause any problems to prove the strong normalizability of λ! .
I Definition 50 (Embedding). An embedding from λ! to λ!,( is defined to be the triple of
the translations (A)‡, (Γ)‡, and (M )‡ given in Figure 19.
I Lemma 51 (Preservation of typing and reduction).
1. If ∆; Γ; Σ ` M : A in λ! , then (∆,Γ)‡; (Σ)‡ ` (M )‡ : (A)‡ in λ!,(.
2. If M  N in λ! , then (M )‡  (N )‡ in λ!,(.
Proof. By induction on ∆; Γ; Σ ` M : A and M  N , respectively. J
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(A)‡
(p)‡ def= p
(A( B)‡ def= (A)‡ ( (B)‡
(!A)‡ def= !(A)‡
(! A)‡ def= !(A)‡
(Γ)‡
(Γ)‡ def= {(x : (A)‡) | (x : A) ∈ Γ}
(M )‡ (x)‡ def= x
(λx : A.M )‡ def= λx : (A)‡.(M )‡
(M N )‡ def= (M )‡ (N )‡
(!M )‡ def= !(M )‡
(let !x = M in N )‡ def= let !x = (M )‡ in (N )‡
(! M )‡ def= !(M )‡
(let ! x = M in N )‡ def= let !x = (M )‡ in (N )‡
Figure 19 Definition of the embeddings (A)‡, (Γ)‡, and (M )‡.
λ∗x.M
λ∗x.x
def= I
λ∗x.(M N )
def= C (λ∗x.M ) N if x ∈ FV(M)
λ∗x.(M N )
def= B M (λ∗x.N ) if x ∈ FV(N)
λ!∗x.M
λ!∗x.x
def= T!
λ!∗x.M
def= K! M if (a)
λ!∗x.(M N )
def= C (λ!∗x.M ) N if (b)
λ!∗x.(M N )
def= B M (λ!∗x.N ) if (c)
λ!∗x.(M N )
def= S! (λ!∗x.M ) (λ!∗x.N ) if (d)
λ!∗x.(!M )
def= B (D! !(λ!∗x.M )) 4!
λ
!
∗x.M
λ
!
∗x.x
def= T!
λ
!
∗x.M
def= K! M if (a)
λ
!
∗x.(M N )
def= C (λ!∗x.M ) N if (b)
λ
!
∗x.(M N )
def= B M (λ!∗x.N ) if (c)
λ
!
∗x.(M N )
def= S! (λ!∗x.M ) (λ
!
∗x.N ) if (d)
λ
!
∗x.(!M )
def= B (D! (!(λ!∗x.M ))) (B E 4
! )
λ
!
∗x.(! M )
def= B (D! (! (λ!∗x.M ))) 4
!
where (a), (b), (c), (d) means the conditions (x 6∈ FV(M)), (x ∈ FV(M) and x 6∈ FV(N)),
(x 6∈ FV(M) and x ∈ FV(N)), (x ∈ FV(M) and x ∈ FV(N)), respectively.
Figure 20 Definitions of (λ∗x.M ), (λ!∗x.M ), and (λ!∗x.M ) for bracket abstraction.
I Theorem 52 (Strong normalization). In λ! , there are no infinite reduction sequences
starting from M for all well-typed term M .
Proof. Suppose that there exists an infinite reduction sequence starting fromM in λ! . Then,
the term (M )‡ is well-typed in λ!,( and yields an infinite reduction sequence in λ!,( by
Lemma 51. However, this contradicts the strong normalizability of λ!,(. J
A.3 Bracket abstraction algorithm
We show the definition of bracket abstraction operators in this section.
I Definition 53 (Bracket abstraction). Let M be a term M of CL! such that ∆; Γ; Σ ` M : A
and x ∈ FV(M) for some ∆,Γ,Σ, A and x. Then, the bracket abstraction of M with respect
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to x is defined to be either one of the following, depending the variable kind of x:
(λ∗x.M ) if x ∈ dom(Σ)3;
(λ!∗x.M ) if x ∈ dom(Γ);
(λ!∗x.M ) if x ∈ dom(∆),
where each one of (λ∗x.M ), (λ!∗x.M ), and (λ
!
∗x.M ) is the meta-level bracket abstraction
operation given in Figure 20, which takes the pair of x and M , and yields a CL! -term.
I Remark 54. As in the case of standard bracket abstraction algorithm, the intuition behind
the operations (λ∗x.M ), (λ!∗x.M ), and (λ!∗x.M ) is that they are defined so as to mimic the
λ-abstraction operation in the framework of combinatory logic. For instance, the denotation
of (λ∗x.M ) is a CL! -term that represents a function with the parameter x, that is, it is a
term that satisfies that (λ∗x.M ) N  + M [x := N ] in CL! , for all CL! -terms N .
I Remark 55. There are no definitions for some cases in (λ∗x.M ) and (λ!∗x.M ), e.g, the case
that (λ∗x.(M N )) such that x ∈ FV(M) and x ∈ FV(N), and the case that (λ!∗x.(! M )).
This is because that these are actually unnecessary due to the linearity condition and the side
condition of the rule ! . Moreover, the well-definedness of the bracket abstraction operations
can be shown by induction on M , and in reality, the proof of the deduction theorem can be
seen as what justifies it. The intentions that (λ∗x.M ) N  + M [x := N ], etc. can also be
shown by easy calculation.
3 dom(Γ) is defined to be the set {x | (x : A) ∈ Γ} for all type contexts Γ.
